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EDITORIAL 
To be or not to be phenomenology? That is the question 
Recent years have seen a burgeoning in phenomenological research on sport, physical cultures 
and exercise. As editors and reviewers, however, we frequently and consistently see social 
science articles that claim to be ‘phenomenological’ or to use phenomenology, but the reasons 
for such claims are not always evident. Indeed, on closer reading, many such claims can often 
turn out to be highly problematic. At this point, we should clarify that our ‘terrain de sport’ 
constitutes what has been termed ‘empirical phenomenology’ (Martínková & Parry, 2011) and 
more specifically from our own ‘home’ discipline, a phenomenologically inspired form of 
sociology. This latter tradition was developed in North America by Alfred Schütz (1972). By 
this, we do not mean philosophical phenomenology in all its rich and varied strands, the modern 
form of which was inspired by Edmund Husserl’s (1913/2002) descriptive and/or transcendental 
phenomenology. The term itself is derived from the Greek phainomenon, from the root phôs, 
meaning ‘light’, thus referring to something that is placed in the light, made apparent or shown. 
Phenomenology is therefore the study of phenomena, things as they present themselves to, and 
are perceived in consciousness. Importantly, it is not just another form of qualitative research; a 
point which we discuss later. 
It is perhaps worth (re)stating that what is often termed ‘modern’ phenomenology (Embree 
& Mohanty, 1997) was developed from the work of Edmund Husserl (1913/2002) in his quest 
to question and unsettle traditional, scientific habits of thought that often left fundamental 
assumptions regarding a phenomenon or phenomena unquestioned and unproblematized. Several 
consistent, recurrent characteristics arose from Husserl's work, which many still consider as core 
assumptions of the 'phenomenological' approach. Although it is important to note that Husserl’s 
(1913/2002) phenomenological thinking underwent substantial reworking and revision 
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throughout his lifetime, one of his key and consistent assertions was the insight that human 
consciousness is intentional; that is, it is always directed at something.  Furthermore, Husserl's 
notion of the phenomenological reduction lies at the heart of his work, as a methodical means of 
cutting through the layers of taken-for-grantedness that envelop a phenomenon, via the epochē 
– sometimes termed bracketing – allowing us to arrive at the eidos or core, essential 
characteristics of a phenomenon. Husserl advocated bracketing (standing back or aside from) 
our extant beliefs and presuppositions about a phenomenon as a central condition of 
phenomenological work, in order to return ‘to the things themselves’ (zu den Sachen selbst). In 
his later writings, Husserl’s (1931/1988) focus shifted towards a consideration of the relationality 
of existence, with his focus on the Lebenswelt, or our commonsense ‘lifeworld’ of everyday 
immediate experience. This lifeworld is subjectively experienced and intersubjectively 
constructed. For Husserl, accessing the Lebenswelt was rendered possible via the 
phenomenological method, which sought to bracket our natural attitude, or everyday, taken-for-
granted ways of thinking and being.  
For many sociologists, however, the idea that we can actually stand outside of our own 
cultural and social-structural (and historical) location, is of course highly problematic, and has 
been questioned by subsequent authors within the 'existentialist' phenomenological tradition, as 
we discuss below. To this end, existential phenomenology is helpful because although it draws 
on Husserl’s work, writers within this tradition, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2001), signal 
the impossibility of achieving full epochē. Of key interest to Merleau-Ponty (2001) was the 
investigation of the corporeal dimension of the body-world-consciousness nexus. Of particular 
relevance to the sociology of sport and physical culture, therefore, Merleau-Ponty (2001) 
considers the role of our own body (le corps propre) as the standpoint of our perception, from 
which we view and otherwise sense the world. In his later writings, Merleau-Ponty (1969) argues 
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for humans’ existential unity with the very fabric, the French chair (flesh), of the world, thus 
challenging any neat distinction between the interior and the exterior world. 
We now move to address what has been considered a social or ‘sociologized’ form of 
phenomenology (Allen-Collinson, 2009), or phenomenologically-informed sociology 
(depending on the emphasis of the particular project). This approach draws upon the social 
phenomenology of Alfred Schütz (1972), whose insights have inspired many of our own 
investigations of sporting and physical cultural embodiment and experiences. Schütz was 
particularly interested in the later Husserlian notion of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt), the shared 
world of everyday life, and the meanings that social actors utilise in everyday interaction with 
others in the lifeworld. This perspective has been useful in exploring the lived experiences and 
lifeworlds of specific sports/physical cultures, such as performance swimming (McNarry et al., 
2019), distance running (Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2017), high-altitude mountaineering 
(Allen-Collinson et al., 2019), karate, capoeira and mixed martial arts (Telles et al., 2018), and 
tai chi (Hjortborg & Ravn, 2019) to give just some examples.  
Both Husserlian descriptive phenomenology, and existentialist phenomenology, have also 
inspired researchers in sport and exercise employing an ‘empirical phenomenological’ 
(Martínková & Parry, 2011) approach. Such use of, or indeed misappropriation (as some 
philosophical phenomenologists might argue) of phenomenology in this corpus has generated 
considerable controversy, including a trenchant critique of the lack of engagement with 
phenomenological writers and primary sources in some of this work (see for example, 
Martínková & Parry, 2011, 2013, and Halák et al., 2014, for critical reviews). The mis-labelling 
of such work as 'phenomenological' is perhaps not helped by a somewhat dubious 
conceptualisation of the 'phenomenological tradition' evident in some research methods texts, in 
which phenomenology appears to be situated, puzzlingly, as just another way to do qualitative 
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research (e.g. Cresswell & Poth 2018). As we have noted previously (e.g., Allen-Collinson, 2009, 
2011), it can sometimes be difficult to ascertain precisely why research has been described by 
its authors as ‘phenomenological’.  
As we describe above, phenomenology is a very specific philosophical tradition, one that 
is most definitely not synonymous with ‘qualitative’ research or indeed any research based 
purely on individual, subjective experience. For phenomenologists, research must move well 
beyond generating and analysing descriptions of individual, subjective experience of 
phenomena, however detailed, well-grounded and richly crafted. Such descriptions would 
constitute phenomenalism, and phenomenology is, we emphasize, not phenomenalism (see also 
Martínková & Parry, 2011; Halák et al., 2014). Phenomenologists are thus not content with 
recounting the immediate, subjective experiences of particular individuals. Instead, we must seek 
fundamentally to question and problematise such accounts, and engage our best efforts in the 
sustained, disciplined bracketing of the natural attitude. Such work should attempt to look afresh 
at, and reflect critically upon a phenomenon, to identify its structure or core essence(s), the very 
thing(s) without which it would cease to be the phenomenon itself. It is also, therefore, likely to 
be characterised by reference to several key methodological processes and foci, including the 
use of description attuned to a particular form of phenomenology, focus upon intentionality, use 
of epochē and eidetic reduction, and characterisation of essences, or core meanings, of a 
phenomenon (Allen-Collinson 2016). Furthermore, and in line with Gallagher and Zahavi’s 
(2008) thoughts, we consider that, should research stay true to the core assertions of 
phenomenological thought, phenomenology in its empirical form can be ‘put to work’ 
productively in analysing and reflecting on data generated by a range of different methods 
(Allen-Collinson, 2009).  
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Given the philosophical, theoretical and methodological specificity of the core branches of 
phenomenological inquiry, why use phenomenological sociology? What can it offer the 
sociologist of sport and/or physical cultures? For us, there are strengths in engaging with this 
sometimes uneasy combination of philosophical tradition and sociological enterprise. Whilst 
departing from its original, philosophical roots, empirical forms of phenomenology, such as 
phenomenological sociology, provide a powerful theoretical and methodological perspective that 
requires us as researchers fundamentally and systematically to identify and challenge the 
everyday and often taken-for-granted assumptions, interpretations and meanings of the natural 
attitude. In this respect, this form of phenomenology coheres strongly with a sociological 
enterprise that also seeks to challenge and contest everyday common-sense understandings and 
ways of thinking. Whilst acknowledging the impossibility of full bracketing, phenomenological 
sociology nevertheless highlights the need for heightened and sustained researcher reflexivity 
(Allen-Collinson, 2011; McNarry et al., 2019) in seeking to identify the everyday assumptions 
that can cloak and obscure the understanding of a phenomenon. Phenomenologists pursue a rich 
and complex theoretical tradition in addressing the mind-body-world nexus, with existential 
phenomenology in particular enriching the sociology of the body in investigating embodiment 
issues, including in sporting and physical-cultural contexts.  
There are, not surprisingly, significant challenges in seeking to combine two very different 
disciplinary traditions (sociology and philosophy) and some compromise is perhaps inevitable. 
In relation to philosophical phenomenology, for example, the quest to identify universal 
experiences is, from a sociological perspective, questionable. Here, the lack of acknowledgement 
of, and analytic attention to, the specificities of embodiment and the lifeworld in relation to, for 
example, gender, age, ethnicity, dis/ability, etc, are is highly problematic, particularly for 
sociologists and others who highlight the considerable impact of cultural and social-structural 
forces upon embodied experience. Yet, we argue that social forms of phenomenology are well-
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positioned to tackle such limitations head on, via the incorporation of analytic insights drawn 
from other disciplines and theoretical traditions. Examples of such innovations include the 
combination of phenomenology with: critical sociology (Hughson and Inglis, 2002) feminist 
theory (Young, 1980, 1998; Fisher & Embree, 2000; Allen-Collinson, 2012), and queer theory 
(e.g. Ahmed, 2007). In our own particular form of phenomenological sociology, we are highly 
cognizant of the potential effects of gender, age, ability, social-structural location, and physical-
cultural emplacement, rather than seeking to identify universal experience. In phenomenological 
sociology, embodiment and lived experiences are thus acknowledged to be specifically human, 
but also gendered, socio-economically classed, aged, ethnicised, and so on, and lived via 
differing degrees of physical and mental dis/ability.  
Hence, in considering why a phenomenologically-sensitive sociology might be of 
relevance to those researching sport, exercise and physical cultures, we can see how 
phenomenology has the potential to generate grounded insights into embodied experiences in 
these domains, including the sensory dimension (Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2015). It also, and 
importantly, provides a powerful means of examining intersubjectivity and intercorporeality in 
sport, exercise and physical-cultural contexts. This highlights the ways in which our minds and 
bodies share the world, socially interact, interconnect and mutually influence each other in these 
contexts.  As has been found, finely attuned intercorporeality is often necessary to accomplish 
sporting and physical cultural enaction (Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2017).  A corpus of work is 
beginning to develop in this field (Meyer & van Wedelstaedt, 2017), for example, in relation to 
running (Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2017), swimming (McNarry et al., 2019), and mixed 
martial arts (Spencer, 2012; Vaittinen, 2016), but at present, there is a relative lacuna in terms of 
research that synthesizes the phenomenological and the interactional. 
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In addition, with regard to interaction, the role of human-object and human-environment 
interaction is salient in many sports and physical cultures, where participants often become 
highly skilled in the use of objects (for example, golf clubs, tennis racquets, hockey sticks, cricket 
bats and balls) and highly attuned to properties of the elements, such as ground, water, or air.  
Such somatic learning often requires the development and refinement of a wide spectrum of 
sensory skills and ways of knowing, needed to execute skilful performance. These corporeal 
ways of knowing develop gradually, over time and with experience and repeated practice, so that 
they eventually become embodied and incorporated into the self.  Highly developed sports and 
physical-cultural skills are, however, not usually completely and fully learnt once and for all, but 
rather they require ongoing and (in many cases) frequent practice and refinement.  Furthermore, 
from a phenomenological perspective, phenomenology the mind-body-world connection and 
context are constantly changing. This is particularly germane to many sports and physical 
cultures, where practitioners have to make constant improvisational adjustments and 
readjustments, for example in relation to weather conditions (Allen-Collinson et al. 2019), to 
changes in terrain (Allen-Collinson & Hockey, 2015), or to opponents on the field of play 
(Hughson & Inglis, 2002), in the ring or fighting cage (Spencer, 2014; Vaittinen, 2016).  
In sum, we suggest that there is and remains the potential for phenomenologically-inspired 
inquiry to provide a significant contribution to the sociology of sport in relation to myriad 
research contexts. At the same time, ‘phenomenology’ continues to be a misused term, seemingly 
applied as frequently to qualitative research with a focus upon subjective experience, as it is to 
work that is more firmly grounded in the substantial corpus of phenomenological writing in the 
transcendental, hermeneutic and existential traditions. As scholars, reviewers and editors, we 
continue to be concerned by the number of studies we receive, which claim to be 
phenomenological, yet fail to pay reference or consideration to the principal phenomenological 
tenets, to key phenomenological theorists and writers, to phenomenological concepts, or to 
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phenomenological methodology, process or rigour (see Allen-Collinson 2016). Yet, when such 
factors are considered, and phenomenological research is situated appropriately within its field, 
the continuing ‘promise’ of phenomenological inquiry (Kerry & Armour, 2000) for the sociology 
of sport remains considerable.     
 
 10 | P a g e  
 
References 
 
Ahmed, S. (2007). Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
 
Allen-Collinson, J. (2009).  Sporting embodiment: sports studies and the (continuing) promise 
of phenomenology, Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercise, 1 (3), 279-296. 
 
Allen-Collinson, J. (2011). Intention and epochē in tension: autophenomenography, bracketing 
and a novel approach to researching sporting embodiment. Qualitative Research in Sport, 
Exercise & Health, 3 (1), 48-62. 
 
Allen-Collinson, J. (2012). Feminist phenomenology and the woman in the running body. In  I. 
Martínková  & J. Parry (Eds), Phenomenological Approaches to Sport. London: Routledge, pp. 
113-129. 
 
Allen-Collinson, J. (2016). Breathing in life: Phenomenological perspectives on sport and 
exercise. In Smith, B. and Sparkes, A. C. (Eds). Routledge Handbook of Qualitative Research in 
Sport and Exercise, London: Routledge, pp. 11-23. 
 
Allen-Collinson, J. and Hockey, J. (2015). From a certain point of view: Sensory 
phenomenological envisionings of running space and place. Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography, 44 (1): 63-83. 
 
Allen-Collinson, J. and Hockey, J. (2017). Intercorporeal enaction and synchrony: The case of 
distance-running together. In C. Meyer and U. van Wedelstaedt (Eds), Moving Bodies in 
Interaction - Interacting Bodies in Motion. Intercorporeality, interkinaesthia, and enaction in 
sports. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, pp. 173-192. 
 
Allen-Collinson, J., Crust, L. and Swann, C. (2019). Embodiment in high-altitude 
mountaineering: Sensing and working with the weather. Body & Society, 25 (1), 90-115. 
 
Cresswell, J. W. and Poth, C. N. (2018). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing 
from five approaches (4th Edn). Los Angeles, CA. Sage.  
  
Embree, L., and Mohanty, J.N. (1997).  Introduction.  In L. Embree et al. (Eds), Encyclopedia of 
Phenomenology (pp. 1-10). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Fisher, L. and Embree, L. (Eds.) (2000). Feminist Phenomenology. Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. (2008). The Phenomenological Mind.  London: Routledge. 
 
Halák, J., Jirásek, I. and Nesti, M.S. (2014). Phenomenology is not phenomenalism. Is there such 
a thing as phenomenology of sport? Acta Gymnica 44 (2), 117-129. 
 
Hjortborg, S.K. and Ravn, S. (2019). Practising bodily attention, cultivating bodily awareness – 
a phenomenological exploration of tai chi practices. Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise & 
Health. Online ahead of print at: 
 11 | P a g e  
 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2159676X.2019.1662475 
 
Hughson, J. and Inglis, D. (2002). Inside the beautiful game: Towards a Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology of soccer play. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXIX, 1-15. 
 
Husserl, E. (1913/2002). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. London: 
Routledge.  First published 1913 in German as Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und 
phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine 
Phänomenologie. 
 
Husserl, E. (1931/1988). Cartesian Meditations (trans. D. Cairns). Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Kerry, D.S., and Armour, K.M. (2000). Sports sciences and the promise of phenomenology: 
philosophy, method, and insight. Quest, 52 (1), 1-17. 
 
Martínková, I. and Parry, J. (2011). An introduction to the phenomenological study of sport. 
Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 5 (3), 185–201. 
 
Martínková, I. and Parry, J (2013). Eichberg’s ‘phenomenology’ of sport: a phenomenal 
confusion. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 7 (3), 331-341. 
 
McNarry, G., Allen-Collinson, J. and Evans, A. B. (2019). Reflexivity and bracketing in 
sociological phenomenological research: Researching the competitive swimming lifeworld. 
Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise & Health, 11 (1), 38-51. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). The Structure of Behaviour (trans. A.L. Fisher). Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1969). The Visible and the Invisible (trans. A. Lingis). Evanston, Ill: 
Northwestern University Press. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2001). Phenomenology of Perception (trans. C. Smith).  London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul.  
 
 Meyer, C. and van Wedelstaedt, U. (2017) (eds.). Intercorporeal and Interkinesthetic Enaction 
in Sports. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing. 
Schütz, A. (1972). The Phenomenology of the Social World.  London: Heinemann. 
 
Spencer, D.C. (2012). Ultimate Fighting and Embodiment. London: Routledge. 
 
Spencer, D.C. (2014). Sensing violence: An ethnography of mixed martial arts. Ethnography, 15 
(2), 232-254. 
 
Telles, T.C.B., Vaittinen, A.M. and Barreira, C.R.A. (2018). Karate, capoeira and MMA: A 
phenomenological approach to the process of starting a fight. Revista de Artes Marciales 
Asiáticas, 13 (2), 114-130. 
 
 12 | P a g e  
 
Vaittinen, A.M. (2016). Intersections of ways of knowing mixed martial arts and visual culture. 
Amodern, 3 (Sport and Visual Culture). Cited 3 October 2019; available from: 
http://amodern.net/issues/amodern-3-sport-visual-culture/ 
 
Young, I.M. (1980). Throwing like a girl: A phenomenology of feminine body comportment 
motility and spatiality. Human Studies, 3, 137:156.  
 
Young, I.M. (1998). ‘Throwing like a girl’: Twenty years later. In D. Welton (Ed.) Body and 
Flesh: A Philosophical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 286-290. 
  
